Return-Path: Delivered-To: diana@transocean.com Received: from vps.transocean.com by vps.transocean.com (Dovecot) with LMTP id 0/n2HffStVjsOQAAInt2oQ for ; Tue, 28 Feb 2017 11:43:51 -0800 Return-path: Envelope-to: diana@transocean.com Delivery-date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 11:43:51 -0800 Received: from [104.168.151.204] (port=36455 helo=jacibrasil.com) by vps.transocean.com with esmtp (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1cingY-0003ob-QT for diana@transocean.com; Tue, 28 Feb 2017 11:43:51 -0800 Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 14:42:01 -0500 To: diana@transocean.com Reply-To: jesse.baldwin@jacibrasil.com Message-ID: Content-transfer-encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 From: Jesse Baldwin Mime-Version: 1 X-Spam-Status: Yes, score=3.5 X-Spam-Score: 35 X-Spam-Bar: +++ X-Spam-Report: Spam detection software, running on the system "vps.transocean.com", has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see root\@localhost for details. Content preview: First, I decided to ignore all this, but several redditors said that if the flashlight developers don't do the stuff described in the report they should come and say so. And here I am. My app doesn't have access to personal data. It doesn't sell personal data to 3rd world countries and doesn't work with unknown companies with unknown background. Now to the technical details... The "counterveillance" company's main argument is that these apps have a long list of permissions accessing different information provided by the OS and thus they must be selling this information to 3rd parties. As many redditors noticed in the comments, the report didn't include information whether they even tried to check the data that was coming out of these apps. How did they decide that there was any personal data involved? How did they find that this data was sold to 3rd world countries? I believe that most other flashlight apps like mine are clear of all this stuff. Of course there are a couple of exceptions with a huge permissions list, which I, as a developer, find it hard to explain. These apps are easily spotted and they don't really need to be flashlight apps. You can find such apps in every category. Since most of you guys are not developers, it's completely normal to not understand the permissions and wonder how they are used. Here's a detailed overview of all permissions in my app. You will see a similar list in almost all other flashlight apps, because a feature rich app cannot go without this minimal set of permissions. take pictures and video (this is the CAMERA permission). Used to activate the camera flash. control flashlight. I'm still supporting Android 1.5 and 1.6 and back in the old days on some devices (moto backflip) the camera flash was activated via a private API, which required this permission. full network access - used for showing ads from Google's Admob view network connections - again for Google's Admob. This permission allows the ads code to detect whether you are on wifi or data. If you are on data the ad [...] Content analysis details: (3.5 points, 3.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- 0.0 URIBL_BLOCKED ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to URIBL was blocked. See http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/DnsBlocklists#dnsbl-block for more information. [URIs: jacibrasil.com] -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.0 SPF_HELO_PASS SPF: HELO matches SPF record 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% [score: 0.4864] 0.7 MIME_HTML_ONLY BODY: Message only has text/html MIME parts 0.0 HTML_IMAGE_RATIO_08 BODY: HTML has a low ratio of text to image area 0.0 HTML_EXTRA_CLOSE BODY: HTML contains far too many close tags 0.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 2.0 RDNS_NONE Delivered to internal network by a host with no rDNS X-Spam-Flag: YES Subject: ****SPAM**** Outdoors type? This could save your life.
XT808 Tactical Led Flashlight

 
 
 
 



 
First, I decided to ignore all this, but several redditors said that if the flashlight developers don't do the stuff described in the report they should come and say so. And here I am. My app doesn't have access to personal data. It doesn't sell personal data to 3rd world countries and doesn't work with unknown companies with unknown background. Now to the technical details... The "counterveillance" company's main argument is that these apps have a long list of permissions accessing different information provided by the OS and thus they must be selling this information to 3rd parties. As many redditors noticed in the comments, the report didn't include information whether they even tried to check the data that was coming out of these apps. How did they decide that there was any personal data involved? How did they find that this data was sold to 3rd world countries? I believe that most other flashlight apps like mine are clear of all this stuff. Of course there are a couple of exceptions with a huge permissions list, which I, as a developer, find it hard to explain. These apps are easily spotted and they don't really need to be flashlight apps. You can find such apps in every category. Since most of you guys are not developers, it's completely normal to not understand the permissions and wonder how they are used. Here's a detailed overview of all permissions in my app. You will see a similar list in almost all other flashlight apps, because a feature rich app cannot go without this minimal set of permissions. take pictures and video (this is the CAMERA permission). Used to activate the camera flash. control flashlight. I'm still supporting Android 1.5 and 1.6 and back in the old days on some devices (moto backflip) the camera flash was activated via a private API, which required this permission. full network access - used for showing ads from Google's Admob view network connections - again for Google's Admob. This permission allows the ads code to detect whether you are on wifi or data. If you are on data the ad requests will be reduced to save you bandwidth. control vibration - some users want the device to vibrate, when they toggle the light prevent the device from sleeping - very important permission for a flashlight app. In my app you can turn on the camera flash and then hit the power button of the device to turn off the screen. It's very handy, because you can hold your device like a real flashlight without hitting any buttons on the screen. Without this permission, the device will fall in "deep" sleep when you hit the power button and the light would turn off. Also, if you are using the screen light you don't want your device to turn off while you are doing something important.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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